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China pe rspect i ves
A recent journal article pointed out:
In practice, China already has “two types of workforces and two
types of workers’ movements.” The first is organised within the sys-
tem under the umbrella of the All China Federation of Trade Unions,
and the second operates outside of it, formed spontaneously by
workers. The first is institutionalised but lacks a following, and the
second has the masses behind it but is not institutionalised. (1)
While these organisations are not all formed by migrant workers them-
selves (and this is especially so in the Pearl River Delta) but also by an
urban elite (lawyers, social workers, and even intellectuals close to the
Party) concerned over the conditions of this social category, they in fact
seem like semi-union organisations seeking to protect the rights and inter-
ests of migrant workers. They help workers file complaints against employ-
ers with arbitration committees or courts, and sometimes go to the extent
of defending them, organising legal training, negotiating with employers,
and putting forward workers’ issues to the authorities. NGOs thus act as a
substitute to official unions, which have long excluded migrants, (2) and
which are increasingly being deemed an ineffective and even illegitimate
form of representation.
Although these NGOs act within the framework of state-encouraged
“participation,” (3) those focusing on defending the rights of “vulnerable
categories” (弱勢群體), especially workers, operate in sensitive terrain.
This is particularly so in recent months, since revolutions in the Arab
world stoked the government’s fears that they could spread to China.
Last January, a propaganda directive banned the use of the term “civil so-
ciety,” (4) which had been widely used for decades in academic journals
and the media. What is the nature and impact of these NGOs’ mobilisa-
tion? Is the government right to fear them? In fact such fear does not
seem justified when these organisations’ function in the Chinese political
system is examined.
A precise and concrete description of NGOs’ work in defending migrant
workers’ rights will show that on the contrary, Chinese social organisations
contribute to the political system’s flexibility and the regime’s dynamic sta-
bility, and thus to the Communist Party’s ability to remain in power. In fact,
NGOs play a major role in defusing social contradictions, in applying and
amending laws, and in formulating public policies better suited to workers’
needs, as well as administrative reforms that facilitate adaptation of the sys-
tem and improvement of its effectiveness. In other words, it will be shown
that while NGOs defending migrant workers’ rights do act as a counter-
weight, they also contribute to the regime’s adaptive capacity and hence to
its durability.
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1. “Xuezhe jianyan zhongguo zhubu shixian laodong zizhi” (Academic’s appeal for a gradual autonomi-
sation of capital-labour relations), Xin Shiji (New Century), 21 June 2011, http://policy.caing.com/
2011-06-21/100271691.html. 
2. It was only in 2003 that the All China Federation of Trade Unions launched a drive to promote migrant
workers’ membership, thus taking into account the lengthening duration of their stay in cities as well
as of the fact that a significant and growing number of those deemed farmers had actually become
workers. See Zhonghua quanguo zonggonghui, Guanyu qieshi zuohao weihu jincheng wugong renyuan
hefa quanyi gongzuo de tongzhi (ACFTU Directive to resolutely protect migrant workers’ legal rights),
4 August 2003, www.people.com.cn.
3. In its Human Rights Action Plan (I, 3), the Party vows to “encourage social organisations to play an ac-
tive role in enlarging mass participation in expressing their demands, and raise society’s self-govern-
ment capacity; the organisations working for the common good must convey the demands and needs
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Striving to be non-governmental rather than
anti-governmental
Chinese NGOs face a legal and political framework that precludes au-
tonomous organisations. Principles of control, cooption, and cooperation
lie at the heart of laws governing social organisations. In order to register
with the Ministry of Civil Affairs or local offices, NGOs have to first find an
“umbrella” organisation (in the state or the Party) to serve as guarantor.
The guarantor has no legal obligation to endorse the organisation, but is
nevertheless responsible for its direction and supervision regarding its pro-
grammes, funding, and expenses. It must conduct an annual inspection of
the organisation and report to the administration. The guarantor must be
from the same field of activity as the NGO, which prevents the latter from
diversifying its programmes. Finally, these organisations must not harm
“national interests” by going against the constitutional principle of the
Party’s leading role, or against national unity or “social morality.” (5) The law
thus stipulates that in order to enjoy official recognition as social organi-
sations, they must, paradoxically, renounce their non-governmental status
and act as extensions of the state or at the very least as its auxiliaries.
The law is in reality widely circumvented, as the NGOs jealously guard
their independence and official institutions are reluctant to draw attention
to practices that could put them on the wrong side of the Party. Moreover,
most organisations are not registered, or pass themselves off as enter-
prises. This compromise helps NGOs enjoy a semi-legal status while pre-
serving their autonomy, with the authorities keeping a wary eye on the or-
ganisations. According to Ministry of Civil Affairs figures, there were
425,000 officially registered NGOs in late 2009, (6) but some estimates put
the real number at between 3 million and 8 million. (7) Furthermore, these
organisations are supposed to pay taxes, but few do so. As a result, tax eva-
sion has become a common pretext for shutting down these organisations
when the authorities find them getting too bold. The fact that the govern-
ment has yet to revise the law on NGOs since its first publication in 1998,
despite many appeals for establishing a more rational and liberal legal
framework, shows its ambivalence towards them. While these organisa-
tions are indispensable to the state, they are nevertheless susceptible to
appearing as a threat. Keeping them in a non-institutionalised grey zone
allows the authorities to cut them down to size when they are found to be
going too far. Judging by developments with regard to the “rights defence
movement” in recent years (rising media-fuelled protests among “vulner-
able” social categories, academics, jurists, and lawyers focusing on high-
profile cases in jurisprudence), relations between the Party and rights de-
fence NGOs have grown more and more tense. The Party is particularly
fearful of their potential to trigger a “colour revolution” as in the former
Soviet republics, especially as the vast majority of their funding comes
from abroad, mainly foundations such as Oxfam Hong Kong, Ford Founda-
tion, World Bank, Canadian and British development funds, US Congress,
the embassies of all three countries, and the European Union. NGOs thus
evolve in a non-institutionalised grey zone in which their semi-legal status
is tolerated so long as they prove useful and loyal to the Party.
These organisations have come up with strategies to deal with their un-
certain status. Their discourse seeks to establish a community of interests
with the authorities and enterprises: they stress that their action con-
tributes to social stability and supports economic development – in other
words, the building of a “harmonious society,” to which the Party is wed-
ded. Their main aim is nevertheless to help migrants who work without
getting paid, who contract workplace illnesses because their employers
have failed to follow laws regarding hygiene and safety, and who are de-
nied medical reimbursement in cases of accidents at work or are refused
compensation for infirmity. NGOs remain convinced that the quest for
general wellbeing is inseparable from that of the welfare of the maximum
number of people, in other words, from the protection of individual
rights. (8) They emphasise that strikes resulting from a lack of protection for
workers’ rights carry major economic costs; that lack of coverage for in-
jured workers plunges entire families into misery, and that such wide-
spread practices are a significant factor of social inequality, especially be-
tween the cities and the countryside, which the Party itself has identified
as one of the potential causes of destabilisation for the regime. NGOs thus
try to find, at least in their discourse, the middle ground where the inter-
ests of different parties converge. In other words, these organisations rely
on rational and pragmatic argumentation seemingly far removed from any
ideological considerations or pronounced political stands. (9) On the con-
trary, they adopt a purely legalist strategy and invoke central government
policies (notably those concerning the protection of migrant workers’
rights or the Human Rights Action Plan), the Constitution (notably the
1999 amendments stipulating that the Party “governs according to the
law,” and those of 2004 affirming that it “respects and preserves human
rights”), or the government’s own laws and statements, including speeches
by Premier Wen Jiabao on the need to promote social justice through
greater redistribution and improved access to justice for vulnerable cate-
gories. (10) NGOs thus prefer dialogue and cooperation to confrontation,
making it clear that they are helping the state and the Party to fulfil func-
tions that they are no longer able to or have yet to take on (thus assuming
the role of “state auxiliaries”), with the aim of promoting the ideal of jus-
tice the authorities have themselves declared and cannot renounce, as well
as developing some programmes in partnership with the authorities.
NGOs also try to forge links with influential allies among the authorities
in order to acquire viability and legitimacy. Thanks to these strategies, Chi-
nese organisations succeed in achieving a relative autonomy in practice
that is denied them by law.
NGO action: Compensating for the system’s
failings while transforming it from the inside
NGOs speak of two essential reasons for the lack of protection for mi-
grant workers’ rights: a labour law that fails to sufficiently protect workers’
interests, and the lack of law enforcement. This is explained by Tong Lihua,
a noted Beijing jurist, in the preface to his book Strive for Justice, in which
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5. Guowuyuan Bangongting, Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli (General Office of the
State Council, Provisional rules for registering non-profit social organisations), 25 September 1998,
www.goldlaw.com.cn.
6. http:// mca.gov.cn
7. The first estimate is by Wang Ming, Centre for the Development of Civil Society, Tsinghua University;
the second by Li Fan, World and China Institute.
8. In this sense, Chinese NGOs do make up a sort of civil society, serving to protect individual rights while
affording a social space for organising actions for the common good. Civil society thus operates as a
synthesis between the individual and the collective, the particular and the general, the private and the
public. See Chen Jianmin, Zouxiang gongmin shehui (Towards a civil society), Hong Kong University
Publications, 2010, pp. 3, 11.
9. Thus, as Chen Jianmin points out, both the New Left and the liberals can connect with NGOs, which
have basically no political orientation. Chen Jianmin, Zouxiang gongmin shehui, op. cit., p. 3.
10. See, for instance, “Premier vows ‘utmost’ efforts to redress injustice, says equity brighter than sun,” 14
March 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/14/c_13210331.htm.
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he cites the experience of the NGO he founded, Zhicheng Gongyi (致誠公
益 - Beijing Zhicheng Migrant Workers Legal Aid and Research Centre),
which believes in the “application of a public interest law (公益法) consti-
tuted in the most realistic and practical manner in order to achieve jus-
tice.” (11) This is revealing of the mission NGOs have set for themselves:
contributing to the amendment of laws to better meet the needs of the
poor and the weak – that is to say, the great majority – and participating
in their application as well as in systemic reforms that enhance their en-
forcement. NGOs’ mobilisation thus makes up for migrant workers’ poor
representation in the National People’s Congress (NPC), (12) the absence of
free trade unions, lack of inspection teams in factories, and the disappear-
ance of mediation committees in the workplace or lack of effective insti-
tutions for mediation and arbitration.
Representing workers’ interests with the government
to amend laws
NGOs play a crucial role in representing migrant workers’ interests to the
state, especially in drawing up labour laws to better protect the interests
of workers and employees. Their mobilisation takes place in the framework
of the “democratic participation” the Party has been promoting in recent
years, especially in the form of public consultation on draft laws, which
helps the Party design public policies and legislation better attuned to
popular aspirations. Chinese NGOs have hastened to fill this breach and
come up with recommendation methods inspired by the Western NGOs
that fund them. They were most active during the drafting of the new so-
cial security law. (13) The draft was put online on 28 December 2008 (opin-
ions were collected until 15 February 2009). Several NGOs discussed the
ins and outs of the draft law with migrant workers in meetings and then
compiled their thoughts into a common stand. 
For instance, the Guangzhou-based NGO Panyu Workers’ Service Centre
submitted a report synthesising the recommendations of several NGOs in
the Pearl River Delta and Hong Kong. They touched on four broad themes:
first, promoting equal treatment among citizens, especially between city-
dwellers and migrants from rural areas. In this context, the report showed
that the draft law did not conform to principles it proclaimed, in particular
“ensuring that the fruits of growth accrue to all citizens,” to the extent that
it failed to correct the unequal treatment suffered by migrants in terms of
social security. (14) The report stressed that in order for the law to protect
all citizens equally, it had to take into account the characteristics of this
population, especially the fact that migrants go through several jobs and
are highly mobile geographically. The report therefore stressed the need for
laws to be applicable everywhere, implying a unification of the systems of
social security, mainly between cities and the countryside. This would re-
quire recentralising management of social security – currently carried out
at the municipal or rural district level – at the national level. The report
also drew attention to Article 45 of the Constitution (“Citizens of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China have the right to material assistance from the state
and society when they are old, ill, or disabled”). It stressed that the term
“citizens” implied that all individuals enjoy equal rights. The draft social se-
curity law contravened this constitutional principle by discriminating
among workers on the basis of the residence permit (hukou), referring to
“urban workers” on the one hand and “rural workers in cities in search of
work” on the other. NGOs also favour abolition of the term “workers and
employees” (職工), which has an urban connotation. They want it replaced
by a neutral term simply standing for all workers (勞動者). The report fur-
ther stressed that the draft law contravened the Human Rights Action
Plan, under which the state committed itself to “abolishing dual structures
in society” (15) in accordance with the principle of “human being as the
basis” (以人為本), as well as with the principle of equality and justice (公平
与正義) proclaimed by the state and the Party. 
Second, NGOs demand a greater engagement by the state and wider re-
distribution, through such means as the adoption of a substantive social
protection system for people whose incomes are less than 40 percent of
the average urban salary in their locality. Another major demand is that
the state should take total and unconditional charge of work accident vic-
tims (hospitalisation and medicine, as well as expenses towards establish-
ing the degree of disability and compensation). (16) Third, NGOs point to
the law’s restrictive nature, which necessitates the adoption of an effective
and independent supervision system, not only of employers but also of the
social security system’s operating methods – its accounts have to be pub-
lished, for instance – as well as effective disincentives (legal procedures
and stiff penalties). Last, NGOs draw attention to a number of articles, and
urge greater clarity for the law so as to forestall misinterpretation in its ap-
plication or in arbitrations or judgments. In other words, NGOs stress the
fact that equality and solidarity are the two principles on which the social
security system should be built: coverage has to be widened through
greater state participation and the adoption of a national-level manage-
ment and redistribution system in order to cover the poorest and the most
mobile (especially migrants unable to contribute for the durations stipu-
lated in the retirement schemes). (17)
Although NGOs were unable to obtain acceptance of the totality of their
demands, the law published in late 2010 does incorporate a good number
of their suggestions. The new law is a step towards more equal treatment
of citizens, noting as it does that it concerns “rural residents working in
cities” as well as city dwellers (art. 95). The principle of portability of social
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11. Tong Lihua, Weile zhengyi (Strive for Justice), Beijing, Falü chubanshe, 2009, p. 1.
12. Since March 2008, three representatives of migrant workers – coopted for having been chosen as
“model workers” by the ACFTU – were allowed to sit on the NPC. This mostly symbolic gesture, com-
ing about within the existing political framework, can hardly go towards promoting real political equal-
ity. Migrant workers actually make up 10 percent of China’s population but represent less than 1 per-
cent of NPC deputies.
13. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui baoxianfa (Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of
China), adopted on 28 October 2010, took effect on 1 July 2011. http://www.51labour.com/
show/100168.html.
14. Due to the persistence of the population registration system known as hukou inherited from the
Maoist era, which grants urban dwellers rights denied to those from rural areas, migrant workers have
long been denied social security coverage. Since the early 2000s, municipalities have begun to adopt
social security systems for such workers, but they function as insurance based on contributions by em-
ployers and employees. They also offer far lower protection than that enjoyed by urbanites in terms
of the extent of coverage. Moreover, as social security is managed at the municipal level, migrants lose
their rights when they leave the city or the job in which they enjoyed insurance coverage.
15. This is due to the residence permit (hukou), under which only cities have for a long time benefited from
a state-run social security system. Since the early 2000s, a cooperative system has been gradually
adopted in the countryside, but the coverage level remains highly uneven between rural and urban
areas. There is no link at present between the two systems, which function independently of each
other, denying coverage to a migrant who has worked and contributed in the city for many years if he
returns to the countryside.
16. This was one of the main issues raised by the NGO Zhicheng Gongyi, which fought 152 cases of work-
related accidents between August 2005, when it was set up, and March 2007. In fact, as stated by Tong
Lihua, no real protection is gained from current rules stipulating that employers who do not contribute
to social security or provide insurance coverage for their employees must put up the entire medical
costs of an employee in case of an accident: most employers simply refuse to pay up. With cases tied
up for years in futile procedural matters, it is the migrant workers who in fact bear the cost of the ac-
cidents they suffer. Tong Lihua, Strive for Justice, op. cit., pp. 221-226.
17. In fact, the draft law stipulates 30 years’ contribution in order to draw full retirement benefits, and 15
years for minimum benefits: in practice, this is impossible for most migrant workers.
Special feature
security rights was upheld, especially with regard to retirement: the law
says that in case an employee is covered in different places during his ca-
reer, his retirement benefits shall take into account the total contributions
made in different localities (art. 19). Consequently, Article 64 envisages a
gradual move towards nationwide management of pensions, with man-
agement of other insurance schemes gradually being devolved to
provinces. However, concrete implementation steps have been left to
State Council directives, while the financial contribution of upper-level ad-
ministrations – especially the central government, which is crucial for uni-
fying different social security systems in cities and the countryside – re-
mains highly fluid. As many NGOs have stressed, the problem is that the
law merely states broad principles without getting into feasibility or imple-
mentation. It does, however, call for greater state participation in ensuring
upfront payment by social security of medical costs entailed by accidents
at work. This would help cover medical and hospitalisation costs should
the employer refuse to pay, or where responsibility cannot be determined
(art. 30). Social security will henceforth also cover the cost of determining
the extent of disability, previously left to the victims. However, the law
fails to include a proposal for fixing employers’ legal responsibility should
an enquiry reveal that an accident was caused by the non-observance of
work safety legislation. While the law allows greater supervision of social
security management through the formation of an experts’ committee of
lawyers, representatives of the insured, employers, and unions, it fails to in-
clude NGOs, despite their suggestion. The committee’s independence is
carefully restricted, as it answers to the executive and not to the legisla-
ture, whereas NGOs had suggested that the committee should be presided
over by the head of the People’s Congress at the administrative level where
the social security system is managed. The distinction between agencies in
charge of collecting and disbursing funds has also not been designated.
However, as per Article 82, any individual or organisation may file a com-
plaint. As for supervision over employers, the law highlights the role of
trade unions, which NGOs had sought to appropriate, as Chinese unions
actually fail to take on the task. Penalties, too, fail to measure up as disin-
centives: firms that do not subscribe to social security for their employees
are subject to fines of 500 yuan to 3,000 yuan, but NGOs had demanded
100 times those amounts. They had also recommended that in case of
missed contributions or falsified documents, double or treble the amount
due be repaid. Finally, the law stresses greater openness: apart from pro-
viding for publication of social security accounts and of audits by supervi-
sory committees (art. 80), it also says the insured have to be kept informed
of their situation regularly, and that they have a right to free information
when they ask for it.
This shows the way in which NGOs rely on the values declared by the
Party in order to persuade it to keep its word and wake up to its responsi-
bilities towards workers. Nevertheless, their reasoned arguments have
come up against lobbying by Chinese and Western chambers of commerce.
The state is likewise inclined to safeguard short-term economic and polit-
ical interests as well as those of lower administrations. In fact, after a law
is passed at the national level, local governments enjoy great latitude over
publishing implementation guidelines in line with their resources and “spe-
cific conditions.” This is why there is a wide chasm, and even real contra-
dictions, between these guidelines and what is proposed through national
legislation. NGOs’ recommendations therefore target local governments
as well, and aim to promote greater compatibility between implementa-
tion guidelines and national laws.
Mounting pressure for better application of laws
NGOs also play an important role in overseeing implementation of laws,
making up for Chinese unions’ lack of independence and for poorly staffed
and inefficient supervision teams in factories. For instance, the Shenzhen
Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Centre (深圳打) and six other NGOs, along with
students of sociology and social work, carried out three surveys in 2008,
2009, and 2010 on the ways in which firms contravene the new Labour Con-
tract Law, which took effect in January 2008. The survey of three cities in the
Pearl River Delta and three more cities in the Yangtze Delta in 2009 featured
hundreds of questionnaires and dozens of in-depth interviews. Survey reports
showed that a mere 73 percent of workers had signed a contract in 2008
(against 93 percent in official figures). Moreover, most contracts were fraud-
ulent, in English and therefore incomprehensible to employees, incomplete
(no address of the firm or job description), or carried the seals of several firms.
Almost 60 percent of workers fail to obtain a copy of their labour contract. (18)
Employers used several stratagems to cut overtime payments, which actually
represent half the earnings of migrants. For instance, they kept to a six-day
week instead of five days, or made workers sign two contracts, each specify-
ing half of their total salary, with just one taken into consideration. This
helped reduce the overtime payment level and other expenses paid by the
employer. Moreover, firms tried to make up for salary rises by increasing the
price of food or of dormitory lodgings, or by multiplying internal rules, fines,
and penalties. This also facilitated the firing of surplus employees over alleged
repeated errors, thus evading compensation payments required in the new
law (a month’s salary for each year served). Fraudulent contracts also com-
plicate action against employers, as some make up false proof with lawyers’
help or benefit from the complicity of arbitration committees or courts,
which follow internal rules distributed by local governments on how national
laws are to be applied. Local authorities have an interest in the firms’ profit
margins, as they are linked to taxable revenue and as the GDP of their juris-
diction is an important factor in how they are graded by central authorities.
In fact, many firms in the Delta pressured authorities during the formulation
of the new law, claiming it favoured workers too much, and threatening to
move out. The 2010 report thus concludes that it has actually become more
difficult for workers to defend their rights under the new law. 
NGOs submitted reports denouncing the system’s failings and illegal
practices to the Ministry of Social Security as well as to the Guangdong
provincial authorities, trade unions, and the Shenzhen Municipal Office for
Legal Affairs, which have all taken note. They were also shared with several
newspapers, which reported them and carried out their own investigations
of employers acting in concert to come up with strategies for flouting the
law. (19) NGOs cooperate with scholars and the media to inform the public
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18. Shenzhen dagongzhe zhongxin (Dagongzhe Migrant Workers Centre), 2008 nian “laodong hetongfa”
shichi qingkuang yanjiu (Report of the 2008 survey on application of the Labour Contract Law), un-
published document; Shenzhen dagongzhe zhongxin (Dagongzhe Migrant Workers Centre), 2009 nian
“laodong hetongfa” shichi qingkuang yanjiu (Report of the 2009 survey on application of the Labour
ContractLaw), unpublished document. For summary in English, see: Shenzhen Dagongzhe Migrant
Workers Centre, New ongoing violations after the implementation of labour contract law in China, 12
June 2009, www.workerempowerment.org. Shenzhen dagongzhe zhongxin (Dagongzhe Migrant Work-
ers Centre), Cong “laodong hetongfa” san nian de shichi qingkuang shentao laodongzhe quanli weihu
de juxian he kunqing (Reflections on limits to protection of workers’ rights based on three years of ap-
plication of the Labour Contract Law), 2010, unpublished document. 
19. See, for instance, “Bang zai laodong hetongfa shang de laozi boyi ” (Elaborate chess game since the
labour contract law), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern weekly), 31 July 2008; “Laodong hetongfa bianx-
ingji” (Changes in the contract labour law), Nanfang gongbao (Southern labour news), 2 July 2008;
“ Bufen zhusanjiao qiye shanzuo “hetong wenzhang” ” (Few firms in the Pearl River Delta respect con-
tract labour provisions), Zhongguo jingyingbao (China journal of management), 23 June 2008.
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and higher-level authorities who may not know what happens on the
ground, and to raise awareness of the problems. They thus play on the di-
vergence of interests and balance of power among different administra-
tions and hierarchies, while relying on public opinion to pressure the au-
thorities concerned into changing their practices. Such resistance – which
basically consists of telling the truth – pushes the limits of what the
regime allows, proving also that the press was prevented from following up
on the 2009 report. Nevertheless, such mobilisation has borne some fruit:
Article 10 of Rules for Promoting Harmonious Labour Relations in the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, (20) adopted by the Municipal People’s
Congress on 23 September 2008, specifies that employers must give their
employees an approved copy of their contract in Chinese, the same hold-
ing true for any revisions. Furthermore, NGOs stress that Article 82 of the
Labour Contract Law, stipulating that any firm that has not signed a con-
tract with an employee must pay compensation double the salary, has
since then been better respected. (21)
However, NGOs are not content with mobilising merely to expose and
denounce the system’s failings. They also seek to overcome them in order
to better serve workers in the short term while striving to promote
changes in the longer term.
Mediation: Cheapest and speediest solution for
workers, NGOs, and the state
Defending rights by following the institutional path is an extremely long
and costly process in China. The law gives precedence to arbitration commit-
tees in the resolution of labour conflicts. All cases have to be referred to
them before going before the courts, which thus serve as appeal courts. (22)
Apart from the fact that arbitration committees often refuse to take up
cases, such as when proof of a labour relation is lacking, (23) and thus block
all paths to institutional resolution of the conflict, they are also notoriously
ineffective. Figures from the Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers
show that of the 466 cases handled by the city’s arbitration committees
over a two-year period, a mere 2.6 percent were satisfactorily resolved. (24)
The procedures are also extremely long: according to the Rules on Govern-
ment Insurance for Work Related Accidents, (25) compensation may take from
three years and nine months to six years and seven months. In fact, the delay
and costs are even greater. A case in point is the experience of a team of 68
construction workers defended by Zhicheng Gongyi.  In claiming 33,000
yuan in unpaid wages, the workers’ leader had to make some 20 trips be-
tween his native Hebei and Beijing. He went 14 times for work inspection,
and 14 more times to courts, apart from contacting nine different institu-
tions such as the municipal construction committee and the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security. During the three years it took to claim his team’s
wages, the migrant worker spent more than 5,000 yuan on transport, ac-
commodation, food, telephone calls, and office expenses. In the meantime,
he had to stop full-time work to focus entirely on his mission. The total cost
of recovering 33,000 yuan of unpaid wages was estimated at 13,000 yuan
by the NGO, which moreover bore the cost of fighting the case. (26) Zhicheng
Gongyi thus demonstrated that the cost of defending rights is very high for
migrant workers, the state, and society (in terms of taxes). A 2005 survey of
8,000 migrant workers in eight provinces showed that in order to claim
1,000 yuan in wages, one has to spend at least 920 yuan and devote 11 to
21 days, which equates to a loss of between 550 yuan and 1,050 yuan in
wages. The state’s expenses (staff salaries) amount to at least 1,950 yuan to
3,750 yuan. As for legal aid, often furnished by NGOs, it amounts to between
3,420 yuan and 5,720 yuan. (27) This explains NGOs’ and migrant workers’
preference for mediation. NGOs do enjoy some influence in negotiating with
employers, if they have strong governmental backing. In reality that is true
of few organisations. Zhicheng Gongyi might be among them, to the extent
that this NGO – registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs – has always fo-
cused on winning the authorities’ trust by relying on dialogue and coopera-
tion at all levels of officialdom, including the central authorities. (28) More-
over, its founder holds several honorary posts: he serves on the standing
committee of the All China Lawyers Association, of which he is vice-presi-
dent, and he is also with the Communist Youth League in Beijing’s Fengtai
District. Similarly, in August 2004, Beijing-based NGO Xiaoxiaoniao (Little
Bird) formed the first mediation committee managed non-officially in col-
laboration with the Legal Affairs Bureau of Beijing’s Dongcheng District. 
NGOs are thus replacing mediation committees that existed in state en-
terprises but have disappeared, making up for unions’ impotence and assist-
ing municipal institutions (labour and social security offices or justice bu-
reaus) that are no longer able to handle the flood of complaints. But as the
functions performed by the state are gradually assumed by NGOs, and with
greater efficiency, this does not augur well for the genuine and lasting sys-
temic changes that so many of them earnestly seek.
Promoting high-profile cases to create a precedent
Some NGOs also focus on fighting high-profile cases, most often collec-
tive, while developing campaigns to plead with authorities in cooperation
with the media in hopes of creating jurisprudence. This was so in the case
of Xu Yan’ge (徐延格) in 2006: the case was fought by Zhicheng Gongyi,
obliging Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) to terminate a practice known as
“dispatch labour” that contravened an interim provision that was to be well
codified in the Contract Labour Law that was under preparation while the
case was in progress. Such workers, often employed by foreign firms and
multinationals in China, are obliged to sign a job contract with a small com-
pany that undertakes to pay their salaries and contribute to social security,
whereas in fact those workers continue to work for the main enterprise. This
practice makes it easy for the actual employers to fire workers when they
are no longer needed, thus greatly reducing compensations paid out. (29) This
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20. Shenzhen jingji tequ hexie laodong guanxi cujin tiaoli, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/dfrd/
guangdong/ 2008-10/08/content_1452415.htm.
21. Apart from NGO action, this improvement was no doubt also due to the end of the economic crisis.
22. See, for instance, Guowuyuan, Gongshang baoxian tiaoli (State Council, Rules governing insurance for
work related accidents), 16 April 2003, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-05/20/content_144.htm.
23. This is often the case, for instance, in the construction sector, where the relationship between workers
and their baogongtou (包工頭) is not subject to a work contract. The baogongtou is a sort of overseer,
often from the same village as his fellow workers, acting as a link between them and the construction
firm of which he is a sub-contractor and the only one with a legal working relationship with it. See Pun
Ngai’s article in this issue.
24. Tong Lihua, Weile zhengyi, op. cit., p. 218.
25. Gongshang baoxian tiaoli, op. cit.
26. Ibid., p. 216.
27. Ibid., p. 22.
28. It enjoys the backing of the Ministry of Justice’s Legal Aid Centre, national and Beijing city Foundations
for Legal Aid, and the national and Beijing Communist Youth Leagues, as well as of the People’s Con-
gress and government of Beijing’s Fengtai District where its office is located.
29. The problem arises from the imprecise understanding of the interim arrangement in the legislation:
“worker’s transfer from one enterprise to another” (laowu paiqian 勞務派遣). Although the labour law
specifies that such transfers should be aimed at reducing joblessness by creating new temporary jobs
– which corresponds to the definition of an intermediary firm recruiting workers on behalf of those
where they work temporarily – the law was vague enough to allow the practice in reverse.
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was in fact Xu Yan’ge’s experience; he was fired after working for KFC for 11
years without a proper contract. He had, however, signed a contract with a
cover agency for a year and five months, which meant the US multinational
paid him compensation of 3,660 yuan instead of the 20,130 yuan he ought
to have received given his 11 years’ service. The arbitration committee re-
jected Xu’s complaint, citing the absence of a work contract with KFC, even
though Xu furnished other proofs attesting to his work relationship with the
US chain. Another 28 KFC employees faced the same fate but preferred not
to pursue legal claims for fear of losing their jobs. In fact, according to
Zhicheng Gongyi, tens of thousands of workers have fallen victim to this
practice in China. (30)
The challenge was all the greater as the new Labour Contract Law was
being discussed, and there was a possibility of the legislation being
amended following public debate, or being accepted as it was, the Euro-
pean and American chambers of commerce having spread the word that
foreign firms would pull out of China if the Labour Contract Law were to
curb the practice of dispatch labour. Reacting to this offensive, publications
such as China Youth Daily and Southern Metropolis News carried articles
explaining how foreign firms made illegal use of laowu paiqian. They
specifically criticised KFC, explaining the Xu Yan’ge case. (31) Meanwhile, the
ACFTU accused KFC through the China Economic Review of applying
human rights double standards by using the dispatch labour practice ex-
clusively for Chinese migrant workers. (32) The press thus became the arena
of confrontation for experts (lawyers, academics), unions, and NGOs on
the one hand, and KFC and the foreign chambers of commerce on the
other. Debate spilled over online, where public opinion overwhelmingly
favoured Xu and called for scrapping the dispatch labour practice. The first
court appearance was a failure: Xu’s plea was rejected on the basis of the
contract he had signed with another firm. KFC then put out an open letter
carried by the press, claiming that its practice was in conformity with Chi-
nese law. Zhicheng Gongyi then mounted a defence by carrying out its
own enquiries, tapping expert opinion as well as contacting a senior ACFTU
official. Zhicheng Gongyi drafted a report based on a strictly legal argu-
mentation, refuting point by point all of KFC’s arguments before the court,
and showing that Xu had been compelled to sign a contract with a cover
agency. This contract was thus null and void, and KFC’s practice did not
amount to “workforce transfer,” inasmuch as Xu continued to work for the
US chain, and illegally at that, since he was denied a proper contract. Xu
was moreover fired over a minor fault, which occurred after he had put in
overtime well above the legally authorised quota. Zhicheng Gongyi’s re-
port also showed that “workforce transfer” amounts to “dispatch labour,”
that is, its purpose is to allow one firm to escape its social responsibilities
and is thus legally unsustainable. The agency with which Xu had signed the
contract lacked the means to assume its social responsibilities, and as
such, the case was emblematic of the misuse of “workforce transfer” when
“dispatch labour” is meant. The report’s last part stressed that Xu’s case
was hardly unique, and that a considerable number of other Chinese work-
ers were affected by this practice. It noted the context in which it devel-
oped and pointed to the offensives mounted by foreign chambers of com-
merce in China, which were trying to safeguard their interests at the cost
of Chinese workers’ fundamental rights. The report also explained the rea-
sons for Xu losing the case by pointing to lacunae in the law. Zhicheng
Gongyi then called a press conference, following which several newspapers
published the conclusions of its report. A few days later, KFC officially ac-
knowledged its mistakes and ended the dispatch labour practice. Xu was
compensated in return for abandoning plans to file an appeal. Finally, the
Labour Contract Law eventually included 11 articles (57 to 67) codifying
the workforce transfer practice. It stipulates that such transfer must take
place with the worker’s assent, that the firm where the worker is sent must
have a minimum capital of 500,000 yuan and set aside a reserve fund, and
that in case of problems such as workplace accidents, the responsibility
falls on both firms. The law also specified that the practice of transfer
should only concern temporary workers for a maximum of two years, and
that an employee cannot be transferred again to another post. Although
the “dispatch labour” practice has not been abolished in name, it has be-
come clearly codified in favour of workers, except on one count: the cal-
culation of seniority. This issue was not tackled, the possibility of creating
jurisprudence on this point having been lost with the amicable settlement
of Xu’s case and abandonment of his plans to appeal. This is highly regret-
ted by Zhicheng Gongyi, which has stressed that the law’s silence on this
issue has in a way allowed the practice to continue: the NGO has had to
fight many cases similar to Xu’s since then. (33) In fact, a recent ACFTU sur-
vey has revealed that the practice has proliferated in recent years and af-
fects 60 million Chinese workers. Their period of employment varies from
two to ten years; the temporary character of such jobs as stipulated by law
is thus flouted. (34) Zhicheng Gongyi underlines that only the principle of
firms’ responsibility for workplace accidents and the prohibition of enter-
prises “dispatching” the same employee several times are respected. But
the dispatch labour practice in fact allows for the payment of different
salaries for the same work, migrant workers being the main victims of the
phenomenon. (35)
Such mobilisation seems to be a good illustration of what Kevin O’Brien
and Li Lianjiang call “rightful resistance”: a resistance that operates at the
limits of institutional channels, combining legal or administrative action
with political pressure (mobilising the media, allying with influential per-
sonalities within the system), and referring to officially endorsed values to
operate within the framework of such values and in tension with them. (36)
NGOs thus take the Party at its word and appeal to it as if human rights
were its ultimate reference point and intangible value (假戲真唱). This ex-
ample shows also that such resistance is struggling to become institution-
alised: while the Xu case was resolved and some peripheral legal guaranties
accrued, the real aim of such mobilisation – affording all workers in such
cases the possibility of obtaining reparations and preventing recurrence of
such practices – has not been realised. From the political decision-making
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30. Another problem linked to this practice is that cover agencies are usually small and precarious. Some
fail to contribute to employees’ social security and are unable to meet hospitalisation costs in case of
accidents at work. 
31. See, for example, “Kendeji citui 11 nian laoyuangong, jujue chengren cunzai laodong guanxi ” (KFC fires
employee with 11 years’ experience and refuses to admit he worked for it), Zhongguo qingnianbao
(China Youth Daily), 13 May 2006; “Kendeji beisu ‘fanlian bu renren’ – lianxu gongzuo le 11 nian
Kendeji fouren shi qi yuangong ” (KFC accused of turning on its own – firm refuses to admit an em-
ployee had worked for it for 11 consecutive years), Beijing qingnianbao (Beijing Youth Daily), 15 May
2005; “Kugan 11 nian bei citui, yin wei jian laodong hetong taoxin zaoju” (A worker is fired after 11
years’ hard work but cannot get his due as he lacked a work contract), Nanfang Dushibao (Southern
Metropolis News), 14 May 2006.
32. “Quanzong guanyuan piping qiye: laodong yonggong gao shuang zhong biaozhun” (ACFTU official at-
tacks firm’s double standards towards its workers), Zhongguo Jingji Zhoukan (China Economic Review),
5 June 2006.
33. Tong Lihua, Weile zhengyi, op. cit., pp. 366-396.
34. Pan Yi (Pun Ngai), Deng Yunxue, “Laowu paiqian zhidu jinxing shi” (When the reform of the delegation
system is adopted), Nanfang chuang, 10 April 2011, http://www.nfcmag.com/articles/2744.
35. Interview with the NGO’s lawyers, July 2011.
36. Kevin J. O’Brien, Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
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perspective, pragmatic considerations and economic interests have pre-
vailed over legal and ethical ones: in this sense, it is possible to speak of a
victory for the foreign chambers of commerce. Moreover, some legal guar-
anties won on paper are not applied. As NGOs themselves admit, the im-
pact of their mobilisation remains limited, and they must always be ready
to remobilise anew. Meanwhile, such mobilisation has longer-term conse-
quences, but more social than political: it has helped workers become bet-
ter informed about the practice of dispatch labour and its effect on their
rights. NGO action has also sparked a debate on the norms that society
needs to foster.
Prevention rather than cure: promoting collective
negotiations
Given these constraints, many NGOs – in the Pearl River Delta espe-
cially – prefer working on preventive measures, on shifting the power bal-
ance at workplaces by training workers to negotiate more effectively with
their bosses. They have conducted workshops where migrants become fa-
miliar with various laws, come to see legislation as self-defence weapons,
and assert their rights. Participants have become aware of the chasm be-
tween what the law says and their own situation; they are encouraged to
identify causes for this (the absence of independent unions, of the right
to strike, and of the possibility of organising themselves autonomously).
Such workshops do not focus on legal education alone, but also seek to
boost workers’ self-confidence, analyse the balance of power within fac-
tories, hammer out a collective identity, and see what can be done within
the prevailing system. NGOs thus help workers become aware of their
rights (which is different from just getting to know the law) and assist
them in developing their bargaining skills. In fact, NGOs claim that more
and more migrant workers have acquired the skills to negotiate directly
with their bosses.  
Some cadres and employers are not necessarily hostile to such bargain-
ing, or even to correcting the power balance within the workplace, to the
extent that such measures help avoid work stoppages, strikes, and other
disturbances that benefit none of the parties concerned. Social dialogue
between NGOs and authorities has also helped push laws in this direction
over the past few years. (37) While the Party has thus far emphasised con-
sultation with workers and not their active participation in decision-mak-
ing within enterprises, Shenzhen municipality’s April 2008 guidelines for
applying the Law on Unions (38) for the first time replaced the term “col-
lective  consultations” (集體協商) with “collective bargaining” (集體談判),
specifying that workers, unions, and employers must have recourse to it
in order to prevent and resolve conflicts. After last year’s widespread
strikes, a pilot study to draw up rules for democratic management of firms
in Guangdong, (39) published in August 2010, set out procedures for the
formation of employees’ representations, clearly defining its powers. It
stipulated that an employer is obliged to enter into collective bargaining
on wages if a third of the workforce wants it. If the employer fails to re-
spond within 15 days and a strike breaks out, those taking part in it can-
not be fired. If implemented, these rules would constitute a major step to-
wards institutionalising the right to strike. Negotiations over their adop-
tion have been stalled for now, mainly due to opposition from Hong
Kong-based firms. A pilot project on rules for collective bargaining in
Shenzhen, (40) published in August 2010, sought to limit the discretionary
powers of employers, who could face a fine of 50,000 yuan if they did not
deliver on what was decided during negotiations. Finally, the revision of
the law on unions this year should lead to greater collective bargaining at
the level of broad industrial sectors and not only within individual facto-
ries.
Although for the Party, worker participation is only conceivable within
the framework of the official unions, the current socio-economic and po-
litical logic suggests that a formula giving greater autonomy to workers
will have to be found in the not too distant future. First, since the 2007-
2008 economic crisis, the Chinese government has preferred Keynesian
policies aimed at stimulating domestic demand and reducing dependence
on external factors. But how is domestic demand to be stimulated with-
out boosting social security and salaries? Also, how to do so without
strengthening workers’ bargaining power? Second, as Jean-Philippe Béja
points out in this issue, although last year’s strikes failed to constitute a
sustained social movement, the authorities know such a movement could
erupt at any time. Workers thus demonstrated a greatly enhanced ability
to mobilise and organise. Finally, as highlighted above, arbitration com-
mittees and courts are already overworked and can no longer take on the
flood of complaints, while the cost of institutional handling of conflicts is
also extremely high for the state and society. As is the custom in China, it
is possible that collective bargaining with “Chinese characteristics” will
emerge when the costs of the current situation proves too great for the
Party.
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Training session on collective negotiations at an NGO 
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What political implications?
NGOs rely on the Party’s declared values, claiming to take them seriously
so as to be able to apply democratic pressure and compel the Party to re-
main engaged in protecting individual rights and the common good. They
have organised an array of measures for surveillance, obstruction, and
judgment, through which they apply corrective power and pressure aimed
at obliging the state and the Party to better assume their own responsibil-
ities. They thus seek to alleviate the authoritarian system’s dysfunction and
to promote change from the inside so as to ensure lasting protection of
citizen’s rights. However, it is difficult for NGO actions to achieve institu-
tionalisation, and they are only able to effect slight corrections in the bal-
ance of power in favour of the weakest and the most impoverished, at the
cost of tremendous efforts and an unfailing devotion to the cause. In this
sense, NGOs constitute a counterweight within the system, playing an in-
tegral role in the regime’s dynamic stability and contributing to keeping
the Party in power. In fact, although they represent an attempt to organise
in defiance of the Party, NGOs also confirm its attri-
butions by representing the concerns of the power-
less to the Party, rather than against the Party. Thus
their mobilisation results in slight legal amendments
and ad hoc adjustments at the margins of the sys-
tem. However, this has little consequence in the po-
litical, institutional sphere. NGOs act as a means of
venting popular discontent in as much as the poor
and the weak find it difficult to gain access to the
state and Party leadership. They thus ensure a mean-
ingful mobilisation for those taking part, create a
sense of social commonality, and find practical solu-
tions for cases of injustice. NGOs thus prevent the
migrant workers they serve from resorting to lawless
acts (public threats of suicide, which often end in loss
of life or crimes against employers) that could add to
the acts of desperation Chinese society is increas-
ingly witnessing. (41) To this one can reply that NGOs’
actions are not unidirectional, and that by raising
human rights awareness among workers, they indirectly contribute to
boosting collective action. However, despite the fact that these collective
actions, although radicalised in recent years, do not yet constitute a social
movement, (42) they exert much-needed pressure for the system to con-
tinue adapting, especially the unions, and for minimum social standards to
continue increasing. In other words, this social mobilisation leads to a
power adjustment needed for the dynamics of change underlying the
regime’s adaptation.
To the extent that they provide an outlet for social tensions and channel
them in constructive struggles fostering slight corrections of inequality
and peripheral systemic changes, NGOs ensure the authoritarian Chinese
regime’s flexibility. They apply pressures needed for the regime’s adapta-
tion and durability. In this sense, they form an integral part of its function-
ing and its dynamic of adaptation. 
z Translated by N. Jayaram
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41. The Yang Jia case in 2008, serial killings in schools last year, or the more recent case of a man who blew
himself up in front of a court in Yunnan, are some major examples of such acts.
42. See Jean-Philippe Béja’s article in this issue.
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Victims of workplace accidents at a hospital in Southern China. NGOs visit
them to inform them of their rights and to help them file complaints against
employers. © Chloé Froissart
